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ABSTRACT 
The organization of inpatient care provision has undergone significant reform in many 
southern European countries although the success of the underlying incentives relies on 
the institutional design with respect to achieving efficiency and promoting policy 
innovation without harming the essential principle of ‘equal access for equal need’ that 
grounds National Health Systems (NHS). This article explores some of the specific 
organizational developments of decentralizations structures drawing from the 
Catalonian experiences. We find that the coincidence of both managerial and political 
decentralization is associated with the mergence of organization and policy innovation 
resulting from policy experimentation at the regional level might be an additional 
feature to take into account when examining the benefits of decentralization.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The world in which public managers function is rapidly changing and vastly different 
Recent policy developments in the organization of publicly funded health care services 
indicate a shift towards more decentralization at an organizational level, whilst 
promoting more management flexibility and autonomy. This shift is reliant on a new set 
of tools derived from principle-agent theories for the transformation of public sector 
management (Gray and Jenkins, 1995) being applicable to the health care arena in those 
countries where the health system is publicly financed and organized. Decentralization 
and deregulation are increasingly highlighted as instruments for providing more 
accountable governance arrangements, and ultimately in attempting to obtain efficiency 
improvements
1
. Indeed, decentralized organizations are theoretically able to take 
advantage of organizational efficiencies and as a result promote internal competition 
and greater transparency (Saltman and Bankaukaite, 2006). Yet, decentralization alone 
will not necessarily succeed if it does not encompass a set of underlying incentives for 
efficiency, and that it is these administrative incentives which may determine whether 




                                                 
1 Decentralization—including here ‘devolution’ as the transfer of authority and responsibility for public 
functions from the central government- to subordinate or quasi-independent government organizations 
and/or the private sector—is a complex multi-faceted concept and here we refer to the political dimension 
at the regional level and  administrative dimension at the organizational level.   
2 For instance routine activities might not improve in performance with decentralization given that they 
are not sensible to the proximity of incentive control and might be relatively homogenous.  On the other 
hand, decentralization in setting where there is limited scope to influence performance can result in the 
loss of economies of scale and a reduction of the governmental  control over scarce financial resources by 
the central government. 
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One way to understand administrative decentralization in particular is to envisage it as 
an institutional reform that affects public policy accountability
3
 by means of replacing 
“top-down rules” with less restrictive contracts that grant varying degrees of autonomy 
to public service providers. Higher organizational flexibility – and discretion in decision 
making – are consequences of the introduction of incentives into health care 
organizations (Hood, 1991). According to this framework, decentralization would be 
expected to reduce direct control (Friedman and Friedman, 1990), smooth out 
hierarchical structures and arguably to increase capacity to identify the performance of 
each agent within specific institutional structures. The move towards organizational 
reform has been intensive in those public policy areas that touch upon welfare policy 
given their marked impact on local constituents who benefit from the performance of 
services such as health care. On the other hand, this makes coordination more complex 
as while there will be greater autonomy at the same time there is a need to improve 
coordination between different agents.  
 
In the health care arena, there have been progressive moves towards the decentralization 
of responsibility to smaller units of management (e.g., at the hospital level), with a view 
in particular to improving performance management. The notion behind this is that by 
increasing provider autonomy, the performance of providers becomes transparent and 
open to the introduction of performance management tools, and accordingly prone to 
the implementation of adequate “checks and balances”. Therefore, greater management 
autonomy is expected to improve provider responsiveness to local needs, facilitate local 
community involvement and hence, improve local accountability to better identify 
outcome improvements (Wilmot, 2004). The examination of the effects of current 
moves towards decentralization and provider flexibility and autonomy are especially 
relevant in those countries such as Spain that have not only decentralized the 
management but also the governance arrangements of their public services 
organizations. Indeed, decentralization encompasses superior choice and arguably a 
better chance for providers to introduce organizational innovations within specific 
geographical areas to adapt policy to fit regional needs and preferences.  
 
The shift towards greater management independence and responsibility from the 
financial payers has been particularly marked in the health care arena and especially in 
those countries with integrated systems such as Spain which are progressively 
decentralised tighter budget limits. This implies fiscal devolution, diversification of 
strategies in health care, drawing heavily on higher managerial discretion. Some 
examples are those of the Private Finance Initiative (in some Autonomous Communities 
in Spain such as Madrid or Valencia, as in the United Kingdom)
4
, contracting out 
strategies in the Basque regions or in Catalonia (as in Portugal hospital staff have been 
moved onto private sector contracts). Both suggest that some efficiency gains from 
                                                 
3
 Accountability is understood in a broad sense as “answerability” , that is captures the idea of being 
accountable is expressed almost exclusively in terms of being answerable or responsive to some entity, 
namely the government either in a centralized or decentralized structure, yet we do not attempt to discuss 
this issue further in this article. For a discussion of the moral elements being see  Dubnick,( 2003). 
 
 
4 Allowing the private sector to build hospitals which are then leased to the NHS typically under 30 year 
contracts  
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greater flexibility can be achieved (Docteur and Oxley, 2003) perhaps at the cost of 
diversity and the sense of loose social cohesion. Indeed, in the health care arena there is 
little comprehensive theoretical grounds on the specific mechanisms that explain the 
extent to which decentralization in health care promotes desirable policy outcomes. One 
of the limitations is that desirable outcomes are highly difficult to identify and measure 
and often performance indicators depend on their institutional setting.   Hence, it is 
important to look at actual s in those countries that have undertaken steps towards fiscal 
devolution and/or the introduction management autonomy and decentralization, in order 
to empirically identify likely factors that may influence the generation of desirable 
outcomes (Pool et al, 2000).  
 
Spain stands as a highly heterogeneous country in both needs and preferences. 
Accordingly, a fiscal and therefore functional decentralized health care system was 
implemented after the country passed its democratic constitution in 1978.  This came 
together with the implementation of a British style NHS (with the 1986 Spanish General 
Health Act) at a time that Britain was starting to prepare the NHS to the next century. 
However, in Spain fiscal decentralization led to a higher support for greater managerial 
freedom against many public complaints that the central system suffered from 
‘excessive bureaucratization’ and was in need of modernization. As a result, a new NHS 
management ‘culture’, arguably more consistent with current values than those of the 
mid 1980s, was introduced across the country (Ormrod, 2003) hand by hand with 
regional devolution. To fulfill an implicit demand for NHS modernization, different 
institutional reforms were developed to improve the managerial flexibility and 
autonomy in health care provision including the development of (i) private health care 
profit making bodies , that is private bodies that devote private funds to specific health 
care activities,  (ii) foundation hospitals, that is public hospitals that work as 
autonomous  accountable institutions, and finally (iii) consortia, referring to bodies that 
manage a combination of several – public and private - units or departments.  Some of 
these new institutions were influenced by institutions that had already developed in 
those autonomous communities where some political responsibility for health care had 
been present since the 1980s, most notably Catalonia. It is not a coincidence that 
Catalonia, as the first autonomous community to have responsibility for health care, 
would also be the first region to implement the new health care organization reforms. 
Given that two thirds of hospitals are privately owned - although under specific 
contracts with the NHS- it can be expected that inherent preferences with respect to the 
governance of organizations would be expected to deviate from the Spanish norm. 
Given the prominence of some “first mover” advantage  within public service 
organizations, the experience of the Catalan health services should be expected to be 
innovative relative to other regions, despite the fact that a comparatively dense network 
of associations and groups might to an extent make certain flexible structures more 
feasible there than elsewhere in the country.  
 
This article has three main purposes. First, to provide a descriptive  overview of the  
organization of inpatient care in Spain and Catalonia – the first region-state 
(Autonomous Community - Communidad Autonoma) within Spain to obtain health care 
responsibilities-  in order to ascertain the extent of organizational innovation. 
Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive description of the incentives facing doctors 
in foundations, cooperatives and consortia vís a vís those doctors employed on 
permanent state contracts in hospitals with a traditional hierarchical structure. Second, 
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we explore current evidence from some regional health services on the expansion of 
decentralization and management flexibility. Third, we highlight some practical lessons 
for those undertaking institutional change in other countries, and especially those 
subject to a similar health system environment. All three examples of new institutional 
hospital structures in Spain are self-governing, enjoying freedom over how they manage 
their budgets; treating patients free of charge, and remaining publicly financed. 
Contrary to what might have been feared, on the basis of these experiences we argue 
that decentralization and diversity in itself does not threaten the public nature of health 
care and might, under certain circumstances produce successful results. 
 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a brief summary of 
the theoretical background underlying organizational innovation in health care. Then we 
describe different organizational models of health care provision in Catalonia and 
elsewhere in Spain. Section four provides qualitative evidence on current findings and 
organization structures while section fives concludes with a discussion pinpointing 
some key lessons from the Spanish and Catalan experience. 
 
DECENTRALIZATION AND AUTONOMY OF HOSPITAL ORGANIZATIONS 
One of the dominant assumptions in the organizational change literature is the need for 
the transformation of hierarchical structures in order for organizations to prosper. 
Decentralization represents one way to deal with the increasing bureaucratization, 
potential entrenchment and limited innovative capacity and lack of local autonomy to 
deal with community specific problems that may be seen in highly centralized 
structures. Hence, decentralization can be seen as an institutional reform that may 
facilitate policy innovation and better suit the needs of consumers of public services 
such as health care users. However, there are a number of ambiguities surrounding the 
rationale for the organization of power arrangements. This is particularly seen in the 
case of public sector organizations that have historically relied on power elites to 
perpetuate established hierarchy schemes (Kraemer et al 1989). It is quite well known 
that public sector political constraints do not allow at the central level high powered 
incentives schemes. The hypothetical trade-off between efficiency and flexibility is 
perhaps the most enduring idea in organizational theory (Thompson, 1967, Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989) whereby flexibility can only be achieved at the cost of efficiency. 
However, some approaches (Galbraith, 1977) indicate that under certain circumstances 
specific organizational designs can improve efficiency and flexibility at the same time. 
Holmstron and Milgrom (1994) recognize that incentives within organizations might 
enhance cooperation and coordination mechanisms that ensure the attainment of both 
efficiency and autonomy (Horn, 1995 and Gibbons, 1998).  Whether this purpose can be 
served by decentralizing health care management to service providers or is better 
guaranteed by a rigid hierarchical supervisory structure is an open discussion in 
management theory literature (Williamson, 1996, Allen, 2002). 
 
In addition to fiscal devolution, decentralization implies an arrangement between a 
principal and an agent hired to accomplish some specific task. As principal-agent theory 
has long argued, appropriate incentives must be provided for the agent to deliver desired 
outcomes. As the principal cannot directly measure the effort level of the agent, 
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incentives need to be provided by making the agent's pay partially contingent on 
performance. Still, some limitations might arise when it is not possible to specify clear 
performance measures in advance or, as in the case of health care, when there are 
measurement problems in identifying efficiency in the provision of services and 
whether they lead to system fragmentation and some equity concerns. The solution 
prescribed by agency theory calls for a comprehensive contract that considers the 
marginal value of all possible activities of agents and the marginal cost to agents in all 
possible states of the world, and the ability of the principal to commit to pay the 
appropriate level of compensation for each outcome (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). 
Nonetheless real world contracts are incomplete; there are inevitably some 
circumstances or contingencies that are left out of the contract, because they were either 
unforeseen or simply too expensive to enumerate in sufficient detail (e.g., the level of 
intangible quality of care). Therefore, opportunities for improving flexibility in health 
care are likely to depend on the specific organizational design as well as on the 
prevailing management culture and legal constraints. 
 
It is possible to distinguish three broad models of decentralization, which differ in the (i) level 
of private sector involvement, (ii) the presence of fiscal and regulatory mechanisms at the 
political local-state level, (iii) accountability frameworks and the extent of autonomy of 
both organizational and financial institutions in the provision of health care and (iv) 
management capacity and the transparency of the financial allocation system is. 
Decentralization following Rondinelli (1983), can take the form of devolution, 
deconcentration, delegation and privatization. The extent to which a country can 
restructure the provision of health care will of course also be constrained by political 
and social values. 
 
THE MOTIVATION AND CONSTRAINTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
INNOVATION IN SPAIN 
Health care expenditure accounted for 7.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), of 
which approximately 72% (5.5 per cent of GDP) was for public expenditure according 
to the latest Spanish Ministry of Health.  From a functional perspective 52% of total 
funding is inpatient and specialized care. Furthermore, 42% of expenditures refer to 
salary and payments to providers and 12% to contracting out arrangements implying 
that potential reform in this area would be expected to exert an important impact on 
expenditure.  Health care is fully financed by general taxation since 1999; and patients 
only make modest out of pocket contribution towards some minor procedures as well as 
paying 40% of the costs of prescription drugs, though still there are exemptions from 
charges for some groups including those over retirement age and reduced charges for 
others including people with certain chronic conditions and disabilities. Three quarters 
of the population believe that all health care services should be fully funded through 
taxation, while 15% (20% in Catalonia) are in favor of some sort of personal 
contribution towards health care costs, while just a tiny minority (around 3% both in the 
whole Spanish state and Catalonia alone) believes that the patient should cover all the 
costs of health care (Barometro Sanitario, 2005).  
 
 The system has worked on the basis of a regionally decentralized structure since the 
early 1980s, when Catalonia became the first Autonomous Community responsible for 
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health care policy, culminating in the complete transfer of such responsibilities to all 17 
Autonomous Communities (AC) by 2002
5
. In the last two decades, and thanks to the 
decentralized nature of the health system, there has been an increase in government 
responsiveness and policy innovation in the organization of health services, which has 
had some impact on the efficiency of health care provision. During the 1990s, the new 
vogue in health care management was the introduction of a contract system (pseudo 
purchaser-provider split) at the hospital and service level. Catalonia and the Basque 
country established independent public agencies to coordinate the purchasing function, 
while a specific measure was introduced by the Catalan system to measure and 
reimburse hospital activity; this was later extended to all AC’s (López Casasnovas, 
1993). During the mid-1990s, Andalusia, Catalonia and the Basque Country introduced 
a prospective payment system based on Diagnosis Related Groups case-mix adjustment 
for complexity that has evolved to a mixed system that includes retrospective global 
budgets. Currently, the vast majority of Spanish ACs are introducing some form of 
prospective payment system based on performance management indicators, which have 
as a benchmark the experiences of Catalonia. Prospective payment or forward-looking 
budgets provide incentives to keep costs down –not to overspend - and avoid 
inefficiencies by stating ex-ante any contract conditions with providers (Chalkley and 
Malcomson, 2000). 
 
Spain ranks highly in aggregate performance, as measured through health indicators 
such as mortality and health expenditure
6
. However, this situation contrasts markedly 
with a rather poor micro-clinical performance as measured by user satisfaction (Blendon 
et al. 2002), clinical practice variation (VPM The Darmouth Atlas for Spain, several 
years), waiting lists and organization climate (Docteur and Oxley, 2003). Interestingly, 
some evidence suggests that whilst about 72% of the Spanish population (80.1% in 
Catalonia) believes that the public health care system has improved markedly during the 
last ten years (Barometro Sanitario, 2005)
7
, barely 48% (41% in Catalonia) believe that 
public services in general have improved. Yet, given that health care, along with 
education, is one of the few responsibilities that have been decentralised to the regions 
this might suggest that either decentralization improves the visibility of health system 
actions that would perhaps have happened in any case, and also or, alternatively it may 
have indeed improved individual perceptions of the provision of health care services in 
Spain.  
 
The Spanish health care system relies on doctors who enjoy civil servant status, 
meaning that their salaries are defined centrally in annual central budgets, and they are 
guaranteed employment for life. There is evidence that the medical profession does 
though retain has a sense of clinical autonomy that is evidenced by ‘unjustifiable’ 
                                                 
5 The transfers to Catalonia were completed in 1981, followed by Andalusia (1984), the Basque country 
and Valencia (1988), Galicia and Navarra (1991) and the Canary Islands (1994). Along with the timing, 
health care financing remained an exclusive central power, with the exception of two regions (the Basque 
country and Navarra), which enjoyed almost full fiscal autonomy in accordance with their historical 
statutes. 
6 - The Spanish Health System exhibits a fifth place in the WHO ranking, with good health standards and 
low public expenditure in terms of GDP (5.4% in 2001). 
7 http://www.msc.es/estadEstudios/estadisticas/docs/BS2005CCAAv3.pdf 
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variations in clinical practice (Moya et al. 2002). Furthermore, health care 
administrators are compelled to manage their resources under a common budget 
constraint, and are subject to restrictive administrative rules; arguably in place to 
prevent fraud but that reduce significantly the scope for management flexibility. In this 
setting, a health care manager use tentative budgets for efficiency improvements, but the 
practice suggests that they end up being retrospectively adjusted and strongly subject to 
political influence given that the medical profession has a strong political voice (Rico et 
al, 1998). Finally, as noted above, evidence from opinion polls indicates that the public 
opposes measures that would result in the introduction of co-payments (Barometro 
Sanitario, 2005), arguably because they view them as a restriction to access to care 
which might in turn be used to justify further welfare state cuts.   
 
The efforts (and failures) to change the present situation include the introduction of a 
variable component into doctors salaries based on productivity (ultimately incorporated 
into basic salary); a purchase-provider split with Programme Budget Contracts (which 
have proved illusory as both providers and purchasers are public agents under a 
centralised retrospective budget); free choice of salaried primary care doctors by 
patients - which has meant a lower work load without losing remuneration; or the search 
for ‘accurate’ payment systems for hospitals on the basis of ‘needed’ activity and thus 
the illusion that ‘worse’ (more activity) is ‘better’ for the institution. Finally, in this 
context and in absence of some more radical changes at the micro level clinical practice, 
policy makers have put a lot of faith in innovation and organizational change. To this 
end professionals seem to have also played the game as this has not impacted on their 
working conditions, and may in fact have even helped to push up their salaries. In 
addition, organizational change may have been seen by the status quo as a way to avoid 
more drastic reforms by relying on macro structural rather than micro level management 
changes.  Finally, health professionals seem to have reacted negatively when they have 
discovered that in fact the goal of improving productivity and reinforcing clinical 
management was behind these innovations. This has been the Spanish experience so far 
when corporations have seen the potential dangers of reforms that shift the current 
status quo. Namely, they have been able to build a coalition with patient groups and 
some political parties, in opposition to the so called ‘privatization’ of the system, and 
thus have consigned past institutional change to the ‘Limbo’ of health care reforms (see 
Lopez Casasnovas, 2007).  
 
ORGANIZATION MODELS FOR HOSPITAL CARE 
 Organizational innovation 
Given the departure point of the organization of health services in Spain, a large array of 
different provider structures have been developed. Table 1 describes the different types 
of organizations within the Spanish public sector. We distinguish five different types of 
organizations on the basis of their legal status, which may be subject to rules governing 
private or public sector institutions. Indeed, the public section can decentralize from 
direct state control using various legal approaches. For instance, certain specialized 
activities might be undertaken within newly established foundation a organization, that 
is non-profit status that manages an endowment or budget to pursue some defined goals 
(e.g., foundation hospitals). The creation of foundations implied conferring some assets 
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to certain activities (e.g., hospital care) and setting up an activity based on labor or 
external contracts. These, unlike administrative contracts, allowed wider flexibility, 
with decision making accountable to an administration body -  so called ‘patronato’ -, 
composed of members of relevant civil society organizations as well as the public sector 
and employees.  Alternatively, public sector bodies might set up a consortium, which 
might be subject to private, or public sector law and governed by an administrative 
council. Other alternative organizations include co-operatives and limited liability 
companies; they differ in that whilst the first is a private mutual organization the second 
refers to a publicly owned company.  Finally, it is important to list autonomous 
organization bodies that undertake specialist public sector functions though subject to 
public sector law e.g., specific units which deal with the needs of older people.  
 
Table 1. Legal   bodies in the Spanish public sector bodies 





Foundations Consortium Cooperatives 
Legal 
subjection 


































Council Patronage Council Council 
* In addition to own resources. 
 
The evidence in Catalonia compared to the rest of Spain comes on the stability of the 
organizational reform that involves public-private Consortia and private foundations in 
hospital care, and more recently Cooperatives and private companies of doctors in 
primary care, which are not part of the public sector though operate within the system.  
These are, commonly, private sector organizations. Foundations are regulated by the 
Law for the Creation of Private Foundations (1994) operating under private sector rules 
to try and ‘escape’ from the constraints of public administration. In similar terms 
public-private non for profit Consortia. New rules allow the employment of staff 
according to general labour legislation, purchasing supplies under private law, and less 
intervention by allowing ex-post control of expenditure, private accountancy rules, etc. 
However, in practice, sometimes public and private are mixed and confused. For 
instance, the supervisory body – the so called ‘protectorado’- and the administration 
body (patronato) are both in the same hands (on a majority basis, the regional health 
authority). With some few exceptions, there is not a separate endowment for Foundation 
expenses and in deciding current revenues, the financer sits on all management boards, 
often appointing managers and representatives in the administration body. 
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Despite criticisms, these Foundations have already survived within different regional 
and political climates. Initially they raised expectations for change amongst highly 
motivated, and then better-paid doctors in these Foundations, reducing the incentive for 
supplementing income through private practice and providing better access to new 
equipment. This shaped a new type of public management culture which went beyond 
the organizational change. However, this is today under thread since payment and 
different working conditions tend to disappear, since doctors in the ‘old’ public 
hospitals have recently had their salaries raised, without any incentive to change in 
working practices, in the interest of having a uniform wage under the argument of the 
single-payer regime. 
 
Besides private foundations, another type of foundation institution refers to public 
foundation hospitals introduced by the Spanish Law for Hospital Foundations in 1999. 
These are subject to a common legislation for the existing Public Hospitals and affected 
hospitals in both regions with (then) centralized and non-centralized responsibilities. 
The anticipated changes are minor (for purchasing inputs, new employment and formal 
accountancy) since they could not affect, in any case, pre-existing employment rights 
and had to be accepted on a voluntary basis by health professionals. Even in this case, 
the potential thread of a general change in current affairs created strong political 
disagreement with medical trade unions and opposition parties.  After a long and sordid 
political debate, the efforts of the Spanish Ministry of Health were put in a closed box 
with no policy change at the national level.  
 
In general there exists a certain contrast between the situation elsewhere in Spain and 
Catalonia, being the Catalan a more successful image of health innovation. This is 
partly the result of the past tradition of an active presence of civil society. Catalonia 
with about seven million inhabitants, a strong sense of community identity and 
aspirations for self-governance, has long had a different experience with health care 
innovations. There is a longstanding tradition of community involvement in health and 
social care. In fact, local authorities, the Church, and private endowments, historically 
complemented the initially poor and basic Spanish health care coverage. As a result, to 
this day a publicly financed network of not for profit organizations provide about two 
thirds of inpatient care. Most of these hospitals are ‘public consortia’, open to private 
not for profit participation, pure private foundations and Mutual Funds. They are 
licensed to provide public services and a contract is set up with the Catalan Health 
Service Authority on the basis of hospital activity. Thus, hospital managers 
autonomously decide on salaries and working conditions for their professionals. So far, 
lower rates of remuneration and more flexible (private compatible) time schedules are 
the norm. At any rate, no discrimination between patients is formally possible within the 
public network and in practice for acute care; risk selection has never been an issue to 
date. 
 
Consortia and foundations work therefore under their own management practices. They 
differ by the rules on which they are created: Consortia develop under common public 
law while foundations are created from specific private legislation. However, in both 
cases, employment policies, managerial charts and internal operating rules differ from 
older Social Security Hospitals. In the case of 16 important hospital consortia, this is 
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reflected in (i) the way they purchase inputs (following private law); (ii) how they 
contract professionals (outside the civil servant regime) and set their working conditions 
(more flexibility and greater compatibility, combining public and private practices); (iii) 
the capacity to deal with provision of care for private insurers only.  With more 
autonomy, they own their assets, although their finances are publicly controlled ex –
post, and they are governed by representatives of the community subject to a lower 
degree of political influence. So far, their management has proved to be robust to 
political change. A member of the local community chairs an ‘associated group of 
interests’ usually with no direct involvement either in politics or in the health care 
business.   
 
Eight important hospital foundations are private organizations given the rules under 
which they operate, but remain under a public protectorate. Their governing body is 
commonly open to representatives of the civil society who risk their reputation and 
assume legal responsibilities for the privilege of leadership. Foundations own their 
assets and operate under the private law in all aspects of their activity. They may borrow 
freely in the private market. Once they enter into contracts with the Catalan Department 
of Health, given their non-profit status, they are licensed and monitored by the public 
regulator in a similar way as consortia.  
 
As aforementioned, historical reasons are behind this particular Catalonian Hospital 
structure, since in the past, local provision of health care came to complement central 
provision, through a diversity of institutions, that today are integrated under a single 
publicly financed network.  
 
In primary care innovation is shorter but still alive, with a dozen of new initiatives of 
health professionals, owners of coops and private companies and working under 
publicly set contracts for well defined geographical areas. As a result, in primary care 
services Catalonia has also avoided opening new Health Area Teams under the old 
administrative rules and salary employment. These new experiments are run currently 
with self- employed doctors, either under ‘Co-operative’ organizational forms or 
Limited Responsibility Corporations. They are financed by capitation, with not much 
elective inpatient care usually being included, and with notional agreements on drug 
prescription costs. This means in reality that primary care in these new areas is 
‘indirectly’ publicly managed since they decide on working conditions, budget surplus 
applications, incentives on peer controls and salaries. They offer more extended 
working hours and some offer additional payments for some minor procedures not 
financed publicly such as some dental treatment, podiatry, etc.  
 
These new organizations are at least 51% owned by their professionals and no one 
individually may own more than 25%, and share holding is disallowed.  Doctors who 
accept a change in status from the former social security primary care teams to the new 
structure do not initially lose their job in the public system for a certain period but they 
do not have their particular post ‘reserved.’ These organizations are subject to private 
law, they own their own assets, sometimes financially supported indirectly by the Royal 
College of Physicians, which offers a sort of leasing contract for equipments to 
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professionals willing to assume some financial risk and managerial autonomy. Needless 
to say those doctors who have left the old regime are a biased sample, since they are 
usually more committed to the public provision of health care (no private practice 
exists), have greater motivation (they are younger) and are probably tired of the old 
rules in which ‘someone from outside tells you what to do, and you get the same 
payment irrespective of the effort you put into the team’.  
 
Evidence 
Given that evidence of organizational reforms is diverse, it is important to provide an 
overview of how Catalonia compares to the rest of Spain at an aggregate level.  The 
Catalonian population accounts for 15% of total Spanish population. Table 2 reveals 
that 24% of all Spanish hospitals are in Catalonia including 53% of all hospitals for 
chronic patients. Given both the historical tradition and the fact that it is a relatively 
affluent region-state, about 31% of all Spanish private hospitals (35% of non-for profit 
hospitals) are found in Catalonia. Only 40 (22%) of hospitals are publicly owned 
compared with 140 privately owned institutions. This figure is markedly smaller in 
Spain as a while where 47% of all hospitals are publicly owned. Yet, the average size of 
hospitals elsewhere in Spain is larger than in Catalonia. However, the caveats of 
decentralised structures come to place when examining the staff composition as 
Catalonia exhibits a larger share of part time and occasional personal, but especially a 
higher proportion of managers. On the other hand looking at the combination of 
doctors versus other health professionals is not significantly different to that of Spain. 
Finally, Catalonia and all Spain exhibits similar level of hospital activity. For instance, 
activity and quality indicators including the percentage of caesarean sections are similar. 
The main differences are that Catalonia seems to treat more patients, and have a slightly 
longer length of stay possibly due to significantly more intensive use of both surgery 
and ambulatory care.  
 
Table 2.  Catalan and Spanish Hospitals 
 Spain Catalonia 
  number % 
Number    
Total 764 180 23.6% 
General 447 80 17.9% 
Acute 119 23 19.3% 
Chronic 116 62 53.4% 
Psychiatric 86 15 17.4% 
Entitlement       
NHS hospital 190 10 5.3% 
Other public 123 30 24.4% 
Total Public 313 40 12.8% 
Private non-for-profit 147 52 35.4% 
Private for-profit 308 88 28.6% 
Total Private 455 140 30.8% 
Resources       
Beds per hospital 208 167 80.3% 
Operating  rooms 4.9 3.5 71.4% 
Personnel       
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>36 hours 346312 49341 14% 
<36 hours 50669 10643 21% 
Permanent 396981 59984 15% 
Occasional 20069 4348 22% 
Total employee 417050 64332 15% 
Health professionals 302992 48473 16% 
Doctors 77527 13481 17% 
 Nurses  113767 17772 16% 
 Managers  5334 1188 22% 
Doctors/Health professionals 26% 28% 109% 
Health/Total 73% 75% 104% 
 Nurses/Doctors  68% 76% 111% 
 Managers/Doctors  7% 9% 128% 
 Manager/Total  1% 2% 144% 
 Activity        
 LOS  9 10.2 113% 
 Patients  146369 28871 20% 
 Surgical in Hospitals  2132810 702484 33% 
 Ambulatory Surgery  389021 140200 36% 
 % Caesarean Section  23.1% 22.5% 97% 
 % Urgent Interventions  84% 88% 104% 
Encuesta de Morbilidad Hospitalaria, 2007 
 
However, examining aggregate evidence is unavoidably missing some micro 
perspective. Therefore other sources of data come form ex-post assessments of 
managerial experiences directly. The Donabedian Foundation for Quality Assessment 
and the Royal College of Physicians of Barcelona have offered initial evaluations of 
these experience of the Catalan case with rather satisfactory results in terms of access to 
health care access, efficiency and public satisfaction. This is basically linked to more 
continuous access to teams (open after five pm) and the sense of membership of an 
innovative group with access to modern equipment, in respect of those units managed 
by the Catalan Health Institute  (the majority of primary care teams). More specifically, 
new organizational innovations in Catalonia, compared against the old civil servant 
regime demonstrate that there are were better indicators in the new GP teams: average 
waiting time for a visit (less than one day in  40% of cases, 68% in 2 days), better 
access to pediatric care after 5 pm (children leave the school at this hour), more 
continuity in health care (by overlapping working schedules along the day) with 
indicators of satisfaction being three times higher for these new teams than for the 
traditional primary care institutions. Equally, good indicators for these new 
organizational arrangements compared with the older institutional structures can be seen 
in terms of the lower utilization of antibiotics for common viral flu (11% versus 31% of 
cases) and for gastroenteritis (6% versus 17%). Some adjustment is however needed 
before assessing the significance of lower prescription costs. Indeed, despite similar 
total costs per capita/year were identified this refers to lower referrals (22% of the cases 
against 33%) and a lower number of visits per inhabitant year (5.3% against 6.8) 
(Fundacion Avedis Donabedian, 2003).  
 
Finally, during the last three years, the Catalan Health Authority has offered, on a 
voluntary association basis, a capitation regime to 5 internal areas (7% of the Catalan 
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population). This constitutes a new organizational framework for health care integration 
on a territorial basis. In this context, providers with diverse legal status  in several health 
system spheres such as primary, hospital and long term care have integrated -so far 
virtually- their equipment and structures to co-ordinate on a more autonomous basis, 
their strategies towards fulfilling the objectives of the Catalan Health Plan. No loss of 
finance comes from a reduction in activity, and incentives for more efficient co-
ordination of primary and hospital care are provided, changing the balance of inpatient 
versus outpatient or ambulatory care, or by reducing the costs of prescription drugs, 
since they are financed on a risk-adjusted population basis. Despite the fact that 
extending the system to the large metropolitan area of Barcelona seems extremely 
difficult (two and half million people), the initial results of evaluation recently 
published by the government of Catalonia are again encouraging. At any rate, this new 
Catalan pilot capitation experiment follows the strategy of not creating hierarchically-
uniform health providers; awards greater autonomy to providers (extended internally 
within their institutions); and pushes for a better co-ordination of health care facilities 
and health strategies to achieve improvements in health outcomes.  
 
Of course, all of these changes involve some potential risk for day-to day practice 
although no evidence on this is as yet available. There may be a risk of increasing the 
administrative costs of the system, a potential violation of some minimum risk pools, 
while hostile attitudes towards reforms which may be seen as privatizing the health 
system may also hamper performance. However, we believe that if public finance and 
public regulation are maintained, these claims are difficult to sustain. The role of the 
regulator is of critical importance as any mistakes made will be much more visible than 
those occurring under more centrally controlled hierarchal public organizations. 
 
ANALYSIS 
In this article we have sought to provide some insights from the experience across the 
whole of Spain and within one Autonomous Community, Catalonia, in particular. We 
suggest that in the absence of a real transfer of responsibilities and financial risk to 
providers, the organizational change is not itself the remedy for improving efficiency in 
health care. The Spanish example suggests that although it is straightforward for health 
system stakeholders to acknowledge the need for change to the organizational 
‘structure’ of care, generally stakeholders are reluctant to change and only accept some 
reforms in order to avoid more drastic measures. Short term mild reforms are then 
accepted in exchange of not modifying significantly the status quo. A successful health 
care reform would require a significant change in the  management at the professional 
level in addition to those reforms that already take place at the organizational  arena to 
avoid the protection of the ‘status quo’ and overcome institutional constrains to 
institutional change. In this sense, the Catalan experience does seem to prove that 
political stability of those reforms over time, together with greater decentralization at 
the provider’s level and on a geographical basis may help to reduce these constraints. 
 
Evidence from Catalonia, indicates that the whole set of organizational reforms can lead 
to the expansion of more flexible terms of employment for health system professionals 
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and the introduction of incentives to encourage health system managers to better control 
the performance of new institutional structures for hospitals. Indeed, the Catalan 
experience suggests that for reforms to be accepted incentives may need to be offered to 
those stakeholders. Without such incentives while policies may be launched, this may 
not be translated into effective action on the ground.  
 
Although the Catalonian Health Service has only a moderate record in terms of the 
evaluation of institutional innovation, Spain as a whole has benefited from observing 
the array of reforms that have taken place in Catalonia. Nonetheless despite this, the 
health care system as a whole in Spain remains largely unchanged. In this context, 
regional decentralization (for all the ACs after 2002) may be a first step to fostering the 
development of organizational innovation to counteract existing vested interests. As a 
result, political decentralization may lead to greater heterogeneity in health care, but this 
does not necessarily have to lead to institutional fragmentation if funding for new 
institutions follows transparent rules and regulation and if coordination of the system 
takes place at the health service level. Moreover policy innovation is not welfare 
improving for the whole system if it is accompanied by policy diffusion to that all 
agents benenfit. For the latter to take place it is important the development of 
information systems within the system to share evidence on the outputs and outcomes of 
certain experience as to encourage “evidence based decision making”.  
 
Nevertheless,  the Spanish experience also indicates that only  limited reforms – in the 
form of changes to the status quo -  take place unless key working conditions, namely  
organizational autonomy and responsibility as well as financial risk bearing are  
changed. There is a need for higher accountability for newly independent hospitals as 
well as incentives to foster desired outcomes, since coordination problems might still 
persist. It is also an increasingly complex task to overcome potential “ratchet effects” 
that often go unobserved in decentralized organizations that are subject to incentives.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Organizational decentralization is a potential mechanism for facilitating change in the 
activity level of organizations including those in health care, which could in turn 
enhance improvements in their efficiency. This may take place through improvements 
in the degree of policy innovation and dynamism seen in the system, as well as greater 
levels of transparency. However, there may also be additional transaction costs 
associated with a looser level of central control (and greater need for voluntary 
coordination and cooperation) and there may also be initial inception costs that would 
be expected to smooth over time.  
 
The extent to which there has been any implementation of organizational innovation 
significantly differs among sectors. In terms of health it may potentially have most 
impact in those cases which historically have had a high degree of central control over 
the financing and provision of services. However some evidence suggests that 
performance levels might not necessarily correlate with the level of activity and 
functional desegregation of semi-autonomous organizations (Pollit et al, 2004) 
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In NHS style health systems in particular, the uniformity of care and organizational 
changes do not in themselves accommodate stakeholders’ interests. The Spanish case 
suggests that policy changes might require transitional costs to reduce resistance to 
change and promote high level political support. Organizational change is neither a 
surrogate for the necessary clarification of the extent of private sector involvement in 
public health care, nor a substitute for a frank discussion on the balance between public 
and private funding. As with all policy reform, ensuring the involvement of all 
stakeholders from an early stage can help facilitate change and create a sense of 
ownership over proposed changes. Without such early involvement proposed innovative 
reform are likely to be unsuccessful.  
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